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Advanced Surveillance Technologies: Privacy and Evidentiary Issues
I.

BACKGROUND
Surveillance technology, which encompasses a large array of technologies used to

observe individuals’ activities and communications, has advanced at a rapid pace and is
becoming more widely available in the general marketplace. This trend is potentially caused by
increasing fears of terrorism following the September 11 attacks as well the ability of
surveillance technology manufacturers to produce the technology at lower costs.1 Although
surveillance technology has long been used by the military and government intelligence
agencies, the use of this technology by law enforcement and now private individuals in areas not
of national security concern is new and raises privacy and evidentiary issues yet to be settled by
U.S. courts.
While it is impossible for traditional surveillance cameras to scan large areas
simultaneously over long periods of time, Ohio-based company Persistent Surveillance Systems
has created a powerful surveillance device that can track people and vehicles across geographic
areas the size of small cities for multiple hours at a time.2 British company Satellite Applications
(SA) Catapult has created the TechDemoSat-1, an advanced satellite “sensitive enough to pick
up rabbit holes under bushes,” and the number of satellites that it will have launched is scheduled
to double in the next decade.3 Intelligent video analytics allows security software to “learn what
is normal” by observing objects in a monitored environment and receiving operator feedback to
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incorporate into the system.4 Intelligent video analytics then analyzes surveillance footage in
real-time and detects abnormal activities that humans may overlook, particularly considering the
limitations of the human attention span.5 In short, the government, private businesses, and
individuals can now access a host of advanced surveillance technology to identify, locate, and
trace individuals, and these technologies have already been used in political demonstrations,
traffic impact studies, and security at sporting events.6
II.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Proponents argue that installing these powerful cameras and satellites may deter crime to

such an extent that would in turn result in higher property values, improved education systems,
increased economic development, and decreased incarceration rates.7 Key areas of focus for law
enforcement would include organized crime, human and drug trafficking, and smuggling.8 The
technology can also be used in more creative manners—for example, Greek officials used
satellite imagery to pinpoint houses with undeclared pools, tracking down tax evaders.9 In the
civil litigation realm, advanced surveillance devices can uncover violations of zoning ordinances
and environmental regulations.10 On the global level, this new technology can improve
international security, going so far as to assist in the enforcement of arms reduction treaties.11
From a purely economic standpoint, more advanced technology means more efficiency as scarce
government resources are shifted away from law enforcement to other sectors.
However, opponents of the widespread use of advanced surveillance technologies argue
that terrorism, the initial reason for the rise of this technology, will not be reduced because
terrorists are not deterred by surveillance and may even welcome the publicity that it provides. 12
With regards to domestic crimes, advanced surveillance systems may be more expensive than
investigating these crimes after the fact; Britain spends roughly 20 percent of its criminal justice
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budget on its video surveillance system.13 Advanced surveillance technologies also open up the
possibility of abuse on a personal level, namely using the technology to blackmail, spy, and
harass.14 Historically, surveillance has focused disproportionately on people of color, which will
likely continue to be of concern as the technology advances.15 Increased surveillance “will have
a chilling effect on public life,” making law-abiding citizens more self-conscious and less able to
enjoy themselves in public spaces.16 Even assuming that advanced surveillance technologies do
in fact serve all of its public policy goals, its use, particularly by private entities, raises
fundamental privacy and evidentiary concerns.17
III.

PRIVACY INFRINGEMENT
Although using satellites to aid in investigations is not new, recent technological

advances enable much more accurate and reliable imagery,18 which can be seen as an
infringement of privacy and a move towards an Orwellian, totalitarian society. To contrast, most
images in Google Earth’s database are taken at an aerial view of 800 to 1,500 feet and updated
monthly on a rolling basis.19 However, for satellites developed in the past few years, pixel
resolution has increased from five meters to thirty centimeters, and visual imagery is updated in
real-time.20 And because most of these advanced surveillance technologies are commercially
owned, individuals who have the financial resources to purchase them may use them to “spy” on
others with great precision.21
The Fourth Amendment guarantees citizens the right “to be secure in their persons [and]
houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.”22 To determine that there has been a
Fourth Amendment violation, an individual must show that (1) “he seeks to preserve something
as private”; and (2) his “expectation [of privacy], viewed objectively, is justifiable under the
circumstances.”23 As in the case of any cutting-edge technology, case law has been slow to catch
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up with advancements in surveillance technology, leaving it unclear what constitutes
“unreasonable searches and seizures” under the Fourth Amendment.
To analogize, courts have generally permitted law enforcement to use aerial surveillance
so long as the footage “captures images visible to the naked eye.”24 Footage capturing images
not visible to the naked eye may constitute an unconstitutional search under the Fourth
Amendment when filmed without first obtaining a warrant.25 Although current surveillance
technology is mostly limited to tracking the location of vehicles and individuals, which appear as
single pixels26 likely visible to the naked eye, it is easy to imagine cameras becoming more
precise so that the vehicles and individuals may be distinguished from one another and their
particular movements monitored, which would not have been otherwise visible to the naked eye.
Courts must then decide the issue of whether to prohibit the use of this surveillance technology
without a warrant, or to do away with the “naked eye” standard.
Courts do not permit law enforcement to use “advanced technology to observe activities
or individuals in areas protected by the Fourth Amendment that would otherwise be
unobservable without a physical intrusion into an enclosure, at least where the advanced
technology is ‘not in general public use.’”27 But it is unclear to what extent a new piece of
technology must spread amongst the general public in order for law enforcement to use it
without first obtaining a warrant.28 Under the “plain view” doctrine, there is no “reasonable
expectation of privacy” in that which is knowingly exposed in open view29 or which is observed
by law enforcement from a “lawful vantage point” such as “public navigable airspace” in the
case of aerial surveillance.30 Courts provide little guidance regarding under what circumstances
an individual can reasonably expect his or her activities and communications to remain private.
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As advanced surveillance devices become more prevalent amongst consumers, the
technology considered to be “in general public use” and what constitutes a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” will likely expand,31 thereby giving law enforcement even greater
latitude to employ advanced surveillance technologies. There is an underlying concern that
advanced technologies will “promote lazy law enforcement,” encouraging police officers to take
shortcuts when gathering evidence, relying excessively on technology rather than their
experience and judgment,32 further increasing the likelihood of Fourth Amendment infringement.
Courts will soon be confronted with the challenge of determining the ability for technology “to
shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”33
IV.

UNFAIR PREJUDICE AT TRIAL
Even if any given advanced surveillance footage manages to fend off Fourth Amendment

attacks, it must still defeat evidentiary concerns in order to be introduced at trial. In criminal
trials in the United Kingdom, evidence introduced often comprises of images allegedly of the
defendant captured by surveillance cameras, commonly known as closed-circuit television
(CCTV), which are ubiquitous in both public and private spaces.34 Because these graphics can
be highly compelling, they may encourage victims and witnesses desperate to nail down the
perpetrator to make an identification when there is still reason for doubt.35 It is easily imaginable
that jurors would find advanced surveillance footage even more compelling, increasing the
likelihood of placing too much weight on such evidence.
As with any evidence being introduced at trial, the probativeness of advanced
surveillance footage must be weighed against its potential for unfair prejudice. Advanced
surveillance footage may be seen as highly probative because it is not merely a reenactment or
reconstruction; it is recorded contemporaneously and generally considered to be “a fair, accurate,
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and authentic representation” of the events that took place.36 This may seemingly eliminate the
need for the party introducing the evidence to lay an extensive foundation for its admissibility.37
However, jurors’ tendency to believe that advanced surveillance footage is always true in turn
creates a tendency to believe that the assertions of the party introducing such footage are also
true, despite the absence of additional evidence and the presence of reasonable doubt.38 The
level of pull that advanced surveillance footage has on jurors incentivizes the party seeking to
admit the evidence to fabricate or alter it, which is possible given that that party likely has
complete control over the technology; this phenomenon tilts in favor of establishing a higher
standard for admissibility.39
Additionally, storage of surveillance footage in searchable databases raises the question
of whether in the future an individual may be prosecuted solely on the basis of facial
resemblance discovered through a database search.40 While facial recognition software is
currently available to law enforcement, it still relies on human judgment and thus does not meet
the “evidential threshold for admission in court.”41 Also, current facial recognition software fails
to take into account the fact that a face may change over a short period of time due to an
individuals’ pose, health, and expression and the fact that some combinations of facial features
may be highly prevalent in a population.42 When these facial recognition issues are combined
with surveillance footage taken from various angles and distances, introducing such evidence in
court may unfairly prejudice jurors.43 Defense attorneys confronted with such evidence and
required to rebut the inference of the defendant’s identity may find themselves unable to do so
due to limited resources, knowledge of the technology, and access to satellite interpretation and
facial mapping experts.44
V.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
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Because the Supreme Court has yet to decide on Fourth Amendment issues surrounding
advanced surveillance technologies, there is no binding precedent for lower courts to apply.
However, legislatures can work towards enacting clearly-defined boundaries in the use of
advanced surveillance technology—for example, how long data may be stored, when footage
may be accessed, and by whom. Police officers should be permitted to access the footage only
after a crime has been reported, and only footage surrounding the specific crime should be
accessed, thus preventing “fishing expeditions.”45 There must be an enforcement mechanism in
place along with a clear set of punishments for violators. Additionally, more invasive advanced
surveillance technologies should be reserved for situations in which traditional surveillance
technologies are “unavailable, unworkable, or inefficient on a cost or resource basis.”46 Needless
to say, all use of advanced surveillance technologies by law enforcement must be approved in
advance by government agencies, barring truly exigent circumstances.47 If advanced
surveillance footage was obtained without prior approval or the existence of exigent
circumstances, the evidence should be excluded at trial.48
If advanced surveillance footage is permitted to be introduced into evidence at trial,
jurors should be cognizant of the quality of the evidence and refrain from rendering its decision
on the basis of this evidence alone. To aid in this regard, courts should issue jury instructions
directing jurors to exercise caution when taking into consideration advanced satellite imaging
paired with facial mapping as evidence.49 Meanwhile, more scientific studies and data gathering
can increase the confidence that jurors have in advanced surveillance technologies. As facial
recognition software becomes more prevalent, studies of large populations should be conducted
to determine the uniqueness of particular facial features and feature combinations to provide a
statistical foundation for identification.50
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